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Abstract
The adoption of small-scale electricity generation has been hindered by uncertain
electricity and gas prices. In order to overcome this barrier to investment, we develop
a mean-risk optimisation model for the long-term risk management problem of an
energy consumer using stochastic programming. The consumer can invest in a number
of generation technologies and also has access to electricity and gas futures to reduce
its risk. We examine the role of on-site generation in the consumer’s risk management
strategy as well as interactions between on-site generation and financial hedges. Our
study shows that by swapping electricity (with high price volatility) for gas (with
low price volatility), even relatively inefficient technologies reduce risk exposure and
CO2 emissions. The capability of on-site generation is enhanced through the use of
combined heat and power (CHP) applications. In essence, by investing in a CHP unit,
a consumer obtains the option to use on-site generation whenever the electricity price
peaks, thereby reducing its financial risk. Finally, in contrast to the extant literature,
we demonstrate that on-site generation affects the consumer’s decision to purchase
financial hedges. In particular, while on-site generation and electricity futures may act
as substitutes, on-site generation and gas futures can function as complements.
Managerial Relevance Statement
Price volatility typically deters investment in most industries. For example, uncertain de-
mand after 2008 led many automobile manufacturers to postpone their expansion plans.
Likewise, in the energy sector, investment in generation technologies by building owners has
failed to meet government targets primarily because of highly volatile electricity and natural
gas prices. In order to facilitate technology adoption by a large consumer that can install
on-site generation, we use an approach that allows for hedging against risk from volatile
prices. We focus on how on-site generation interacts with financial hedges, i.e., how the
availability of technology affects the consumer’s decision to use financial hedges and vice
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versa. In particular, we find that since investing in combined heat and power applications
reduces the consumer’s demand for electricity futures, on-site generation and electricity
futures may substitute for one another. Conversely, when gas futures are available, the con-
sumer is more likely to install on-site generation because a fixed fuel price results in larger
risk reduction, thereby indicating that gas futures and on-site generation can function as
complements. Hence, we develop an optimal investment and hedging strategy to facilitate
technology adoption by a risk-averse consumer facing volatile prices.
2
1 Introduction
Climate change has emerged as one of the most contentious and critical issues of our time. Its
probable severe economic and environmental consequences have prompted many countries
to set a series of targets to reduce their CO2 emissions [1]. For example, the European Union
(EU) aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020 and by 85-90% by 2050
compared to 1990 levels [2].
One of the ways in which the EU seeks to achieve these targets is by improving energy
efficiency in terms of both supply and consumption [3]. There is substantial scope for reduc-
ing CO2 emissions through improved generation technologies. The current central-station
model of electricity production leads to energy losses of 35-60% as heat waste, and a fur-
ther 6% of generated electricity is lost during transmission.1 Thus, the current paradigm
is not only polluting but also unsustainable in the presence of continued demand growth.
One possible solution is the use of distributed energy resources (DER), which are small-scale
generation sources located closer to end-users. This way, waste heat can also be captured
and utilised to meet local heating demands in buildings or to generate mechanical energy
in manufacturing. Such combined heat and power (CHP) applications can increase over-
all energy efficiency at any location requiring both electricity and heat. For example, the
presence of city-wide district heating schemes enables Denmark to supply 80% of its heat
demand through cogeneration, thereby becoming one of the most energy-efficient countries
in the world [4].
Although policymakers have set ambitious targets, technology-adoption decisions are
typically made by power companies and large consumers, e.g., residential estates, office
buildings, and factories. Since the late 1980s, policymakers have gradually deregulated power
sectors with the intention of increasing competition between producers [5]. Consequently, the
1990s saw the introduction of several directives from the EU that sought to extend the single
market principle to the electricity industry [6]. However, deregulation often resulted in flawed
1http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=105&t=3
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market designs, which led to market power abuse and spot price volatility [7]. In addition, in
Europe, the increased share of intermittent generation resulted in more frequent price jumps
and negative electricity prices, while the gas price has been affected by political uncertainties.
As a result of such policy changes and market uncertainties, energy producers and consumers
face increased exposure to financial risk, which hampers their investment decisions precisely
when new technologies are required to replace inefficient and unsustainable ones.
Considering this situation, in order to gain policy insights about increasing efficiency
and reducing CO2 emissions, it is important to understand how the risk associated with
electricity and gas spot price uncertainty can be managed at the consumer level. With this
in mind, we explore the roles of on-site generation as a physical hedge and electricity and gas
futures contracts as financial hedges against energy price risk. Specifically, we demonstrate
that risk-averse consumers, even if they face increasing gas prices and decreasing electricity
prices, should invest in on-site generation. In accounting for risk, we show that the ability of
CHP to swap electricity (with high price volatility) for gas (with low price volatility) increases
the value of on-site generation as a physical hedge significantly. Finally, we examine how on-
site generation interacts with financial hedges, i.e., how the availability of on-site generation
affects the consumer’s decision to purchase financial hedges and vice versa. In particular, we
find that, while on-site generation and electricity futures may substitute one another, on-site
generation and gas futures can function as complements.
2 Literature Review
The benefits of on-site generation and CHP have been analysed using deterministic, real
options, and stochastic programming approaches. From a deterministic approach, the eco-
nomic adoption and diffusion of CHP generation is examined in [8] using net present value
(NPV) calculations. Siddiqui et al. [9] compare the economic benefit of installing different
types of DER at a hypothetical microgrid in California. Using mixed-integer linear program-
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ming, they demonstrate that an optimally run microgrid with gas-fired CHP turbines has,
on average, lower CO2 emissions than microturbines without heat exchangers. Expanding on
[9], [10] analyses the conditions under which a microgrid with CHP is profitable, particularly
when also equipped with heat storage technology. Thus, such deterministic approaches have
the advantage that they account for the detailed thermodynamics at the building level over
a fine time resolution. However, these deterministic models ignore uncertainty in electricity
and fuel prices, which means that they are unable to assess the impact of risk exposure on
DER adoption and sizing.
Addressing uncertain electricity prices, [12] applies real options valuation to investments
in decentralised renewable power generation. Results from a case of wind power genera-
tion for an office building suggest that, within the context of uncertain electricity prices,
the threshold price for investment is higher than the NPV break-even price. Maribu and
Fleten [13] use Monte Carlo simulation to show that cogeneration is particularly attractive
with volatile electricity prices because the CHP plant’s ability to respond to high prices pro-
vides efficient hedges to energy cost risk. Using a similar approach, [11] determines that the
adoption of small-scale distributed generation has been slow because uncertainty in future
energy prices represents significant economic risk and suggests feed-in tariffs for its mitiga-
tion. Analysing an industrial firm’s choice, [14] finds that under higher price volatility levels,
it is more profitable to invest in a CHP system than in a conventional heat-only generation.
Siddiqui and Maribu [15] examine the effects of a sequential strategy on the investment of
a microgrid when capacity and heat exchanger upgrade options are available. They con-
clude that a direct investment strategy is preferred with a combined distributed generation
and heat exchange system compared to the sequential strategy due to the cost savings from
heat production and capture. Thus, the real options approach allows for the possibility of
stochastic prices in not only assessing the value of waiting but also determining the optimal
threshold price for investment. However, with rare exceptions, e.g., [16], the real options
approach does not directly tackle risk reduction.
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By contrast, stochastic programming facilitates risk management as it can provide robust
solutions over worst-case scenarios [17, 18] even with tail-dependent dependence structures
[19]. Since the deregulation of the electricity industry, stochastic programming has been
widely applied within the power sector. Fleten and Kristoffersen [20] compare stochastic
programming and deterministic approaches in devising bidding strategies of a Norwegian
hydropower producer. They find that using a stochastic programming model yields, on
average, more profitable configurations than using a deterministic approach while improving
robustness. Carrio´n et al. [21] use stochastic programming to model cost minimisation
of a large risk-averse energy consumer with on-site generation. They discuss the tradeoffs
associated with bilateral contracts, self-production, and purchasing electricity from the pool.
A multi-stage stochastic optimisation model is developed by [22] to analyse the impact of
carbon price uncertainty on investments in the energy sector. However, a disadvantage
of the stochastic programming approach is that the computational requirements increase
exponentially with the complexity of the problem being analysed. In order to cope with
these limitations of stochastic programming, [23] provides scenario-reduction and formulation
techniques.
We apply stochastic programming to the investment problem of a large consumer, which
has been examined previously using only deterministic models and real options. While
a similar perspective is taken in [21], our model also incorporates uncertain gas prices in
addition to uncertain electricity prices. Furthermore, we allow for the possibility of heat
recovery by a CHP application and examine the associated investment decision, which is
not considered by [21] in their purely operational model. More important, we examine
the options of investing in on-site generation and entering into electricity and gas futures
contracts in the same model.
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3 Model Description
Our model addresses the investment problem of a hypothetical commercial consumer with
electricity and heat loads. Initially, the consumer owns only a gas-fired boiler, but it has the
option to invest in various-sized gas-fired microturbines, with or without heat exchangers,
at the beginning of the time horizon. If this option is not exercised, then the consumer can
meet its electricity loads only through purchasing electricity on the spot and futures markets.
Similarly, the consumer covers all of its heat loads by purchasing gas on the spot and futures
markets for its boiler. Unless otherwise indicated, we assume that both electricity and gas
and futures contracts are physically settled. If a microturbine without a heat exchanger is
installed, then the consumer can meet (part of) its electricity demand with on-site generation,
for which the gas is purchased on the spot and futures markets. If CHP is installed, then
the consumer also has the possibility to recover the heat waste from its electricity generation
and utilise it to supply (part of) its heat loads (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Energy system of a consumer with CHP
We assume that the consumer is a price taker and that it faces uncertain electricity and
gas spot prices. By contrast, since energy loads in commercial buildings can be forecast
accurately [24], we assume that both electricity and heat loads are known in advance. Like-
wise, technology costs are assumed to be fixed in real terms as our focus is on managing
7
the risk from uncertain prices (see [25] for incorporation of technology cost risk). Thus, the
consumer makes its investment and futures contracting decisions without knowing spot price
realisations, but it can purchase additional electricity and gas later, when their spot prices
are known. Therefore, the consumer’s investment problem can be formulated as a linear
mixed-integer multi-stage stochastic program with recourse. To take into account possible
risk preferences, we assume that the consumer’s objective is to minimise its expected cost
plus a penalised risk measure with weight B. For the risk measure, we use the conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR), which estimates the expected loss with a confidence level A ∈ [0, 1) in
the worst (1−A)× 100% cases. CVaR is a coherent risk measure [26], and, as it can be for-
mulated using linear programming, it is suitable for optimisation problems [27]. Intuitively,
for A = 0.95, the CVaR is the expected discounted cost given that we are in the 5% worst
scenarios. Finally, we examine different regimes for the consumer in terms of risk aversion,
such as B = 0 for a risk-neutral regime and B > 0 for a risk-averse regime.
3.1 Decision-Making Framework
The time horizon of the optimisation problem is divided into main periods indexed by
t ∈ T := {1, . . . , T}, each of which is split into subperiods, indexed by m ∈ M :=
{1, . . . ,M}, of equal length (see Fig. 2). The decision to invest in on-site generation has to
be made at the beginning of the first main period, i.e., at t = 1, without knowledge of the
long-term price realisations and is effective immediately. At the beginning of every main
period, the consumer can reduce its risk exposure by purchasing electricity and gas futures
for physical delivery at a constant rate in each subperiod of that main period. Subsequently,
the consumer can adjust its futures purchases by going on the spot market to purchase elec-
tricity and gas at their realised prices in each subperiod within that main period. These
futures decisions are made under uncertainty, in this case regarding the short-term price
realisations. Similarly, the consumer also decides in each subperiod how much electricity
to generate and how to meet its heat demand. The decision-making timeline is necessarily
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stylised with the representation of quarterly time steps for making operational adjustments
or annual ones for purchasing futures contracts as justified in Section 4.1 with discussion
of scenario generation in Appendix B. Finer resolution of both types of decisions would be
more realistic but at the expense of greater computational time.
Figure 2: Decision-making timeline
3.2 Mathematical Formulation
The consumer’s investment problem is formulated as a mixed-integer stochastic program, in
which the goal is to minimise the expected present value of its cost plus the CVaR with B
weight. The uncertain price processes are represented through a scenario tree (with nodes)
combined with a scenario fan (with subscenarios) per node. The model’s notation and a
detailed description of the scenario generation method are presented in Appendices A and
B, respectively. An essential part of the problem formulation in stochastic programming
models is the implementation of the non-anticipativity principle, i.e., decisions need to be
taken without knowing in advance the future outcomes. Therefore, the investment decision,
wi, i ∈ I, is the same in every node and subscenario, whereas the futures purchase decisions,
xfn, y
f
i,n, and z
f
n, are the same for each subscenario at a given node n ∈ N . By fixing these
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decision variables and certain parameters, we can also explore various cases in which financial
or physical hedging is not allowed. For example, fixing wi = 0, ∀i, xfn = 0, ∀n, yfi,n = 0, ∀i, n,
and zfn = 0, ∀n corresponds to a case in which the consumer must procure all energy on the
spot market. Similarly, fixing xfn = 0, ∀n, yfi,n = 0, ∀i, n, and zfn = 0, ∀n corresponds to a
case in which only physical hedging is allowed. Finally, setting the parameter Ehi = 0, ∀i
allows us to investigate cases without CHP but with MT and financial hedging.
3.2.1 Objective Function
The objective function (1) minimises the sum of the expected value and a weighted CVaR
of the present value of the consumer’s cumulative costs, where Qn is the probability of node
n:
minimise
∑
n∈NT
Qnγn + B
(
ξ +
1
1− A
∑
n∈NT
Qnηn
)
(1)
This weighted average in Eq. (1) allows us to explore not only risk-neutral but also risk-averse
consumers. Indeed, the risk from volatile energy prices may be a deterrent for potential
adopters of DER. Thus, we are not restricted to examining only the admittedly unrealistic
objective of minimising expected costs.
3.2.2 Constraints
Eqs. (2a)–(2b) define the CVaR constraint of the present value of the cumulative cost of
running the consumer’s energy system, ∀n ∈ NT . Intuitively, the objective function in Eq.
(1) aims to make the non-negative variable, ηn, as small as possible. Here, ξ represents the
A× 100% quantile of the present value of the cumulative cost, i.e., the value-at-risk (VaR).
In nodes with γn ≤ ξ, ηn is driven to zero, i.e., the present value of the cumulative cost at
node n is less than the VaR. However, in nodes with γn > ξ, ηn > 0 represents precisely the
excess in the present value of the cumulative cost over ξ at node n. Hence, weighting ηn by
probability Qn in Eq. (1), summing up over all n in the terminal main period, and scaling
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by the 1
1−A
term yields the expected excess in the present value of cumulative costs relative
to ξ, which is just the CVaR once ξ is added:
γn − ξ − ηn ≤ 0 (2a)
ηn ≥ 0 (2b)
Eq. (3) updates the present value of the cumulative cost of energy provision, ∀n ∈ N , as
the present value of the cumulative cost in the preceding node plus the discounted expected
amortised capital, futures, and spot operational costs incurred within that main period’s
subperiods:
γn =


̟n + Φn if n ∈ N1
γb(n) + (1 +RH)
−(t(n)−1)M(̟n + Φn) otherwise
(3)
Eq. (4) calculates the expected present value at the beginning of the main period t(n) for
all spot operational and amortised capital cost within that main period, ∀n ∈ N :
̟n =
∑
s∈S
Qss
(∑
m∈M
(1 +RH)−m(Ψ + Ωn,s,m)
)
(4)
Eqs. (5)–(7) give the amortised capital, futures, and spot operational costs, respectively,
∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀m ∈M:
Ψ =
∑
i∈I wiNi (5)
Φn =
∑
i∈I(F
g
n + V
e + LcC)yfi,n + F
e
nx
f
n + (F
g
n + L
cC)zfn (6)
Ωn,s,m =
∑
i∈I(P
g
n,s,m + V
e + LcC)yi,n,s,m + P
e
n,s,mxn,s,m + (P
g
n,s,m + L
cC)zn,s,m (7)
Eqs. (8)–(9) ensure that the electricity and heat demands are met, respectively, ∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈
S, ∀m ∈M. For example, Eq. (8) states that the electricity purchased from the spot market
and the futures market plus that generated on-site (using fuel procured from either the spot
or the futures market) must at least equal the electricity demand. Likewise, Eq. (9) requires
the total heat available from CHP plus the boiler (again using fuel from either the spot or
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the futures market) to meet the heat demand:
xn,s,m +
xfn
M
+
∑
i∈I E
e
i
(
yi,n,s,m +
yfi,n
M
)
≥ DeHJ (8)
∑
i∈I hi,n,s,m + E
b
(
zn,s,m +
zfn
M
)
≥ DhHJ (9)
Eq. (10) restricts the use of recovered heat, ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀m ∈ M, where Ehi
represents the heat capture rate of technology i:
hi,n,s,m ≤ Ehi Eei
(
yi,n,s,m +
yfi,n
M
)
(10)
Eqs. (11)–(12) ensure that the CHP and boiler capacity limits are observed, respectively,
∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀m ∈ M, where Eei and Eb represent the electrical conversion efficiency of
technology i and the boiler conversion efficiency, respectively:
Eei
(
yi,n,s,m +
yfi,n
M
)
≤ wiKeiHJ, ∀i ∈ I (11)
Eb
(
zn,s,m +
zfn
M
)
≤ KbHJ (12)
Finally, all decision variables must be non-negative, ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S, ∀m ∈M:
wi ∈ {0, 1}, xn,s,m ≥ 0, yi,n,s,m ≥ 0, zn,s,m ≥ 0, xfn ≥ 0, yfi,n ≥ 0, zfn ≥ 0 (13)
4 Numerical Examples
4.1 Data and Cases
While Europe has a relatively high level of CHP production, with Denmark, Finland, and
the Netherlands having some of the highest rates of cogeneration in the world, the potential
for further CHP implementation is substantial. Golbach [28] estimates that over 50% of
Germany’s total electricity demand could be provided through CHP. Accordingly, Germany
has passed three different legislations since 2002 promoting the adoption of CHP with the
aim to increase its rate of cogeneration from the current level of 14.5% to 25% by 2020 [29].
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However, due to factors like uncertain fuel prices and economic stagnation, the trajectory of
CHP adoption relative to the 25% target has been unsatisfactory during the past few years.
In order to examine the risk exposure of a hypothetical consumer with CHP and study
ways to mitigate it, we implement a case study using German data. Due to its climate and
EU policy, northern Europe is an ideal testbed for CHP expansion. We solve the resulting
optimisation problem over a time horizon of eight years, incorporating four main periods,
with eight subperiods per main period. Each main period, therefore, covers two years, while
a subperiod covers a quarter. We illustrate the effect of physical and financial hedges on
the decision-making process through several cases, which differ in terms of available hedges
(Table 1). As noted in Section 3.2, these cases are generated by simply forcing appropriate
decision variables and parameters to be zero. Thus, if financial or physical hedges are
allowed, then their sizes or quantities are also decision variables. The impact of risk aversion
is captured by varying the B parameter.
The microturbine parameters (Table 2) are collected from [11], [30], and [31]. We consider
microturbines without CHP (MT) and microturbines with CHP (MT-CHP) of different
capacity sizes. The results have not been validated at a real site because it is generally
not possible to advise a consumer to switch its energy procurement strategy and to observe
the subsequent changes in costs. However, [25] did validate the performance of stochastic
programming tools for technology adoption and operation by real buildings. In particular,
the observed energy consumption and cost patterns of a Spanish test site are faithfully
replicated by the model when it is run by an independent energy auditor for only the current
year with investment decisions disabled.
We estimate spot price parameters using data from the European Energy Exchange’s
(EEX) German electricity and gas markets, while Phelix and Natural Gas Futures markets
data from 2007-2012 are used for estimating price parameters for the financial contracts
(Table 3). Risk premia for electricity and gas futures are calculated using two-yearly futures
since each main period consists of two years.
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Table 1: Consumer’s hedging cases
Case Electricity Gas DER
futures futures investment
1 - No hedges
2 - Electricity futures only X
3 - Gas futures only X
4 - Both futures X X
5 - Physical hedges X
6 - Physical hedges with elec-
tricity futures
X X
7 - Physical hedges with gas
futures
X X
8 - Physical hedges with both
electricity and gas futures
X X X
Other parameters, including electricity and heat loads, the CO2 tax, and the risk-free
interest rate, are specified in Table 4. Note that the tax on CO2 emissions and operational
and maintenance costs remain constant in real terms over the entire time horizon. Using four
main periods with two sources of uncertainty results in 64 nodes, which produces 640 scenar-
ios in total assuming 10 subscenarios per node. For each case, we examine different regimes in
terms of the level of risk aversion (B). With these numerical examples, we examine whether
on-site generation investments can be regarded as physical hedges to mitigate the consumer’s
risk exposure and explore how they interact with financial hedges, such as electricity and
gas futures. The optimisation problems are implemented as mixed-integer linear programs
(MILPs) in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) using the basic open-source
nonlinear mixed integer programming (BONMIN, see https://projects.coin-or.org/Bonmin)
solver on a desktop with an Intel Core i7 2.79 GHz CPU and 8 GB RAM. The solution times
range from 50 to 400 minutes.
4.2 Discussion
Our findings confirm that on-site generation with CHP reduces both expected energy costs
and CO2 emissions compared to cases with no on-site investment. In addition, the results
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Table 2: Available microturbine (MT) technologies with and without CHP
Technology
index, i
Type of genera-
tion unit
Capacity,
Kei
(kWe)
Electrical
con-
version
efficiency,
Eei
Total efficiency of
producing elec-
tricity and useful
thermal energy,
Eei+E
e
iE
h
i
Total invest-
ment cost
(Me)
1 MT-small-1 200 30% 30% 0.20
2 MT-small-2 400 30% 30% 0.40
3 MT-medium 600 30% 30% 0.60
4 MT-CHP-small-
1
200 27% 78% 0.27
5 MT-CHP-small-
2
400 27% 78% 0.54
6 MT-CHP-
medium
600 35% 88% 0.77
Table 3: Process parameters for electricity and gas prices
Electricity Gas
Starting price (e/MWh) 49.0 21.0
Yearly average spot price:
Price volatility (σeo,σ
g
o) 27.5% 22.5%
Price correlation (ρo) 0.80
Quarter-yearly average spot price:
Price volatility (σeq,σ
g
q) 30.1% 18.9%
Price correlation (ρq) 0.83
Two-yearly futures:
Risk premium (Re,Rg) 13% 3%
indicate that on-site generation can hedge against volatile electricity prices, even if on-site
generation has low efficiency or if the spread between electricity and gas prices decreases.
Finally, we show that on-site generation as a physical hedge can be substituted with or
complemented by financial hedges. The main results for a risk-neutral consumer (B = 0)
based on cases in Table 1 are summarised in Table 5. Table 6 presents the same results for
a maximally risk-averse (B =∞) consumer. Note that, due to no-arbitrage futures pricing,
futures purchases are always zero in the risk-neutral regime. By comparing the expected cost
and the CVaR for any case, it is possible to appreciate the dispersal of optimal solutions.
For example, focusing on Case 8-w/o CHP, the expected cost can go from being e7.59M
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Table 4: Demand parameters and CO2 tax
Length of subperiod (H) 0.25 a
Length of main period (G) 2 a
Electricity demand (De) 1 MWe
Heat demand (Dh) 1.5 MW
CO2 emissions tax (L
c) e21/ton
Operational and maintenance cost (V e) e2/MWh
Risk-free annual interest rate (R) 1%
on average to e12.83M in the 5% worst-case outcome if the consumer is risk neutral (Table
5). By contrast, this spread is narrowed down when the consumer is maximally risk averse
(Table 6): the expected cost ranges only from e8.10M on average to e11.82M in the 5%
worst-case outcome.
Table 5: Results in a risk-neutral regime (B = 0)
Case Expected
cost
(Me)
CVaR
(Me)
Installed
capacity
(kWe)
Expected
CO2
emissions
(kiloton)
Overall
energy
efficiency
Cases 1–4 and
Cases 5–8 w/o
CHP
7.59 12.83 0 59.19 72.2%
Cases 5–8 w/ CHP 7.02 10.69 800 49.14 79.0%
Insight 1: CHP reduces the expected cost compared to purchasing electricity
from the market or generating electricity without heat recovery.
From Table 5, the installation of CHP in Cases 5–8-w/ CHP leads to a significant decrease in
expected cost compared to Cases 1–4 and Cases 5–8-w/o CHP. Over the eight-year period,
the expected cost with CHP is reduced by 4.5%. Furthermore, compared to Cases 1–4, the
overall efficiency of the consumer increases in Cases 5–8-w/ CHP. Note that the benchmark
for efficiency is relatively high as a significant proportion of Germany’s electricity is gener-
ated using nuclear power (although current policy favours its phase-out by the year 2022)
and renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, this modest efficiency increase in Cases 5–8-w/
CHP translates into a significant decrease in CO2 emissions over the eight-year period. It
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Table 6: Results in a risk-averse regime (B =∞)
Case Expected
cost
(Me)
CVaR
(Me)
Installed
capacity
(kWe)
Electricity
futuresa
Gas
futures
for
boilerb
Gas
futures
for MTc
Expected
CO2
emissions
(kiloton)
Overall
energy
efficiency
1 7.59 12.83 0 0% 0% 0% 59.19 72.2%
2 7.70 12.02 0 9.0% 0% 0% 59.19 72.2%
3 7.62 12.63 0 0% 10.7% 0% 59.19 72.2%
4 7.69 11.97 0 7.0% 3.8% 0% 59.19 72.2%
5-w/ CHP 7.02 10.69 800 0% 0% 0% 49.14 79.0%
6-w/ CHP 7.03 10.63 800 1.1% 0% 0% 49.14 79.0%
7-w/ CHP 7.06 10.48 800 0% 1.7% 3.0% 48.96 79.2%
8-w/ CHP 7.07 10.44 800 0.7% 1.6% 3.1% 48.96 79.2%
5-w/o CHP 7.88 12.30 800 0% 0% 0% 60.86 68.1%
6-w/o CHP 7.80 11.96 400 6.7% 0% 0% 60.02 70.0%
7-w/o CHP 7.91 12.06 800 0% 8.2% 0.4% 60.87 68.0%
8-w/o CHP 8.10 11.82 600 5.6% 9.2% 0.7% 61.20 68.3%
a Fraction of electricity consumption supplied by electricity futures
b Fraction of heat consumption from boiler supplied by gas futures
c Fraction of electricity consumption supplied by gas futures
is equivalent to a 2.3% annual rate of decline over the same period, which is significantly
larger than the 0.5% annual decrease recorded over the last eight-year period in Germany.
This result provides support for German CHP laws, which aim to promote CHP installation
in order to reach the 2020 targets.
Insight 2: On-site generation reduces the consumer’s risk exposure compared to
purchasing electricity from the spot market.
The CVaR of the consumer can be diminished by decreasing either its expected cost or the
volatility of its running cost. In fact, the consumer’s CVaR is the highest when it meets all
of its electricity demand by purchasing electricity from the spot market and uses the boiler
for heating by purchasing all of its gas from the spot market. When CHP is installed in
Case 5-w/ CHP, both under risk-neutral and risk-averse regimes (see Tables 5 and 6), the
consumer’s CVaR decreases by 16.7% compared to Case 1. As the expected cost in Case
5-w/ CHP reduces by 4.5% relative to Case 1, the remaining part of the CVaR reduction,
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12.2%, is due only to the lower volatility of the cost of running the energy system. Thus,
the majority of the reduction in the CVaR derives from swapping electricity spot purchases
for gas spot purchases using CHP. This risk-reducing effect of CHP persists even when gas
prices increase enough to turn the spark spread, i.e., the difference between the electricity
price and the cost of generation from gas, negative. In effect, CHP serves as a physical hedge
that enables a risk-averse consumer to swap electricity for gas under certain scenarios. The
CVaR is reduced the same way in Cases 5–8-w/o CHP, but the consumer invests in on-site
generation only under risk-averse regimes. Since the MT w/o CHP has low efficiency, it
cannot reduce the expected cost relative to Case 1 (see Table 6); however, it can still reduce
the consumer’s CVaR by using gas spot with low volatility when the electricity price peaks.
Insight 3: Electricity futures and on-site generation are substitutes.
As consumers also have the possibility to hedge against price risk through financial markets,
it is important to assess how the availability of electricity futures affects the consumer’s
investment decisions in on-site generation. Comparing the cases with risk-averse regimes
(Case 2 and Case 6-w/ CHP in Table 6), the proportion of electricity futures purchased
decreases significantly when CHP is present. Since CHP generation is very efficient, it can
decrease CVaR at a lower cost by producing energy on-site whenever the spot electricity
price peaks. Electricity futures have less scope for CVaR reduction and are, therefore, used
very rarely. Moreover, when only the less efficient MT w/o CHP can be installed, the
availability of electricity futures decreases the need for on-site generation. This is why the
installed capacity drops to 400 kWe in Case 6-w/o CHP compared to 800 kWe in Case 5-
w/o CHP. These findings show that electricity futures and on-site generation are substitutes.
Insight 4: Gas futures and on-site generation are complements.
The consumer can purchase gas futures for either on-site generation or for boiler heat pro-
duction. Since the gas spot price has low volatility, gas futures for the boiler can reduce
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the CVaR only slightly. Nevertheless, as the boiler is more efficient than the MT w/o CHP,
these purchases assist on-site investment in Case 8-w/o CHP, where the installed capacity is
200 kWe higher compared to Case 6-w/o CHP when only electricity futures are available (see
Table 6). Gas futures for on-site generation would increase the running cost for the consumer
in Case 8-w/o CHP; however, the consumer can mitigate some of the price volatility of spot
gas for the MT by purchasing gas futures for the more efficient boiler. On the other hand,
when CHP is installed, the consumer purchases most of the gas futures for the MT, thereby
further reducing the consumer’s exposure to electricity price volatility. Therefore, while the
combined share of gas futures purchases for the MT and for the boiler are the lowest in
the cases w/ CHP, gas futures become more cost-effective at reducing CVaR when CHP is
present.
According to [33], the biggest obstacles to CHP adoption in Germany are risk aversion
and an unfavourable gas spark spread. This is why it is important to note that, in fact,
on-site generation can work as a physical hedge by reducing the consumers’ CVaR, which is
not captured by NPV and real options analyses. In fact, our results demonstrate that under
a positive gas spark spread, even cheaper but less-efficient technologies, i.e., microturbines
without heat exchangers, can limit risk exposure to peaking electricity prices. Furthermore,
consumers can decrease their expected cost by investing in CHP, which can also function as
an efficient hedge in case of a significant reduction in the average gas spark spread. However,
a liquid electricity futures market might have an adverse effect on on-site generation. The
availability of electricity futures can decrease the willingness of risk-averse consumers to
invest in technologies w/o CHP since they can be as effective at reducing CVaR as on-site
generation without heat recovery. On the other hand, the availability of gas futures can
contribute to more investment in on-site generation as shown in Cases 7-w/ and w/o CHP.
While financial hedges play an important role in risk management, from a social point of view,
CHP investments provide more benefits in terms of lower CO2 emissions and more reliable
electricity supply. Thus, policies affecting electricity and gas markets can also influence
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progress towards enhancing energy sustainability. To examine how the interaction between
physical and financial hedges affect on-site generation investment, we next investigate each
type of hedge separately.
4.3 Limitations of Financial Hedging Alone
In order to understand better the interaction between financial and physical hedges, we first
examine the effectiveness of financial hedging alone. To do so, we focus on the efficient
frontiers for Cases 1–4. Such frontiers are delimited by varying the B parameter in order to
make determinations about the mean-risk tradeoff. The rate of tradeoff can be analysed by
comparing the slope of the mean-risk efficient frontier, from which we can derive the amount
of CVaR reduction per e1 increase in the expected cost (see Fig. 3). There are four efficient
frontiers here, but the one for Case 1 is just a single point as the consumer has no scope
to adjust its energy procurement when neither financial nor physical hedges are available.
Furthermore, the efficient frontiers for Cases 2–4 share the risk-neutral point at B = 0 with
each other and Case 1. Thus, the dotted lines emphasise the shared initial point among the
four efficient frontiers.
The largest decrease in CVaR occurs between B = 0 and B = 0.35. At this level of risk
aversion, gas futures are more efficient than electricity futures at reducing CVaR, i.e., a e1
increase in expected cost with gas futures leads to larger CVaR reduction, but the effect of
electricity futures is larger, i.e., they reduce the CVaR by 6.3% compared to 1.6% with gas
futures. This is because the electricity spot price is more volatile than the gas spot price,
which means that electricity futures can reduce CVaR to a larger extent, even though their
risk premium is higher (Table 3). Consequently, a consumer with only financial hedges can
reduce its CVaR by purchasing mostly electricity futures as both financial hedges would
result in a total CVaR reduction of 6.7%.
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Figure 3: Efficient frontiers for Cases 1–4, i.e., no physical hedges
4.4 Impact of Financial Hedging on MT without Heat Recovery
We next examine the impact of financial hedges when an MT w/o CHP is installed. As
a starting point, compared to the purely financial hedges in Cases 2–4, a solely physical
hedge, i.e., an MT w/o CHP on its own, is less effective: the maximum CVaR reduction in
Case 5-w/o CHP is 4.1%, compared to 6.7% with financial hedges, and is reached at a much
higher cost. The reason for this is that the MT w/o CHP has a low electrical conversion
rate, which can be used only in a few scenarios, but its capital cost increases the consumer’s
expenditure in each scenario. Furthermore, the consumer can decide in every main period
whether to enter into futures contracts, which makes financial hedges less burdensome on
the expected cost. Nevertheless, installing an MT w/o CHP on its own is still attractive for
a risk-averse consumer. Plus, it becomes more effective when coupled with financial hedges.
Insight 2-w/o CHP: Less efficient on-site generation can also reduce the con-
sumer’s risk exposure.
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Figure 4: Efficient frontiers for Cases 5–8 w/o CHP with installed capacities (left panel) and
energy purchases (right panel) indicating the impact of physical hedges
From Tables 5 and 6, we conclude that an MT w/o CHP is always inferior to CHP, but
it still can function as a physical hedge. In the risk-neutral regime (B = 0), the consumer
does not install any on-site generation in cases w/o CHP. Nevertheless, in risk-averse regimes
(B > 0), the consumer installs microturbines whenever they are available. Furthermore, the
more risk averse the consumer becomes, the more generation capacity it installs even without
the availability of financial hedges (left panel of Fig. 4). As above, the reason for this is
that the volatility of the gas spot price is lower than that of the electricity spot price. The
consumer can, therefore, decrease its CVaR by installing on-site generation and swapping
the volatile electricity spot price for the less volatile gas spot price. For example, in Case
5-w/o CHP at B = 0.37, the consumer invests in 200 kWe of on-site generation (left panel
of Fig. 4). Due to its low efficiency, the microturbine supplies only 3.6% of the electricity
load (right panel of Fig. 4) but has the potential to supply 20%. Thus, even though the
microturbine lies mostly idle, it still enables the consumer to avoid peaking electricity prices,
thereby significantly decreasing its CVaR.
Insight 3-w/o CHP: The degree of the substitution effect between electricity
futures and on-site generation is determined by the level of risk aversion.
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Fig. 4 shows that the consumer invests in less on-site generation capacity when electricity
futures are available. This indicates that electricity futures and on-site generation are sub-
stitutes in the sense that increasing the purchases of electricity futures reduces the scope of
on-site generation for CVaR reduction. Conversely, lowering the risk premium for electricity
futures (decreasing the investment cost of MT) reduces the risk-averse investment in on-site
generation (electricity futures). However, this substitution effect varies with the cross-price
elasticity depending on the level of risk aversion. At B = 100, a one percentage point de-
crease in the risk premium for electricity futures leads to lower on-site generation investment.
On the other hand, at the same level of risk aversion, only a 20% decrease in the investment
cost would result in more on-site generation investment and less futures purchases. At a
lower level of risk aversion, B = 1, when the consumer installs the 200 kWe MT, a 14%
decrease in the price of MT is sufficient to increase the demand for on-site generation to 400
kWe, while only a 12 percentage point decrease in the risk premium would result in no on-
site investment and increased electricity futures purchases. The substitution effect between
electricity futures and on-site generation varies because their effects on CVaR reduction also
vary. Investing in on-site generation gives the option to the consumer to swap gas spot
prices for electricity prices. Consequently, on-site generation with low efficiency requires a
sufficiently large spread between gas and electricity spot prices such that the CVaR reduc-
tion from on-site generation remains larger than the increase in the expected cost. As such
a price spread occurs infrequently, the 400 kWe MT remains idle predominantly while the
200 kWe MT is sufficient most of the time. This is why the substitution effect of electricity
futures is larger when the 400 kWe MT is installed. Thus, in terms of CVaR reduction, MT
w/o CHP is more competitive against financial hedges if installed in a small capacity.
Insight 4-w/o CHP: The complementarity between gas futures and on-site in-
vestment depends on the level of risk aversion.
At B = 100 in Case 8-w/o CHP, a two percentage point decrease in the risk premium for gas
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futures increases investment in on-site generation from 600 kWe to 800 kWe. At the same
level of risk aversion, a 10% decrease in the investment cost increases the on-site investment
to 800 kWe and, thus, increases the demand for gas futures for boiler heat production from
5.1% to 6.9% of the heat demand. As a result, gas futures have a larger impact when the
marginal CVaR reduction of on-site investment is small. In Case 8-w/o CHP, this is also
due to the presence of electricity futures, which are substitutes for on-site generation. At
the risk-aversion levels specified in the left panel of Fig. 4, a decrease in the risk premium
for gas futures does not lead to more investment. On the other hand, a decrease in the
investment cost leads to more investment, which in turn leads to more gas futures purchases.
Therefore, in Case 7-w/o CHP, on-site generation is a better complement as it has a stronger
effect on gas futures purchases than gas futures purchases have on the investment decision.
Nevertheless, the presence of gas futures still affects the investment decision, as indicated by
the mean-risk efficient frontiers of Cases 5 and 7-w/o CHP. When gas futures are present in
Case 7-w/o CHP, investment decisions are triggered at a lower value of B compared to Case
5. For example, the consumer invests in 400 kWe at B = 0.35 when gas futures are available
and at B = 0.50 when gas futures cannot be purchased.
4.5 Impact of Financial Hedging on CHP
Having demonstrated the efficacy of CHP in decreasing the consumer’s expected cost in
Section 4.2, we now further examine Cases 5–8-w/ CHP by focusing on the CHP’s role in
risk management. Relative to Case 1, Cases 5–8-w/ CHP have much lower expected cost
and CVaR, e.g., compare Figs. 3 and 5. Furthermore, the installed generation capacity is
the same in all risk-neutral and risk-averse regimes, i.e., 800 kWe. As the CHP is efficient,
the consumer uses on-site generation to decrease its expected cost in the risk-neutral regime
whenever the electricity price peaks. Thus, there is no scope for further CVaR reduction
by swapping electricity for gas, and, hence, the consumer does not install more capacity in
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risk-averse regimes.
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Figure 5: Efficient frontiers and energy purchases for Cases 5–8 w/ CHP under B = 0,
B = 1, and B = 100 indicating the impact of physical hedges
Insight 3-w/ CHP: The substitution effect of electricity futures for on-site gen-
eration is much weaker with CHP in comparison with MT w/o CHP.
While the shares of both electricity and gas futures are lower compared to Cases 5–8-w/o
CHP, the decrease in the use of electricity futures is more than that of gas futures (see Case
8-w/ CHP in Fig. 5 and Case 8-w/o CHP in the right panel of Fig. 4). When the installed
generation capacity cannot be used economically, the electricity spot price is low with low
volatility; therefore, the consumer purchases electricity futures at only those main scenario
nodes when the average gas spot price is relatively high and the electricity spot price is still
volatile. As this happens rarely, the share of electricity futures is much lower than in the cases
w/o CHP. This indicates that MT w/ CHP and electricity futures are substitutes. Since the
consumer invests in CHP in the risk-neutral regime, the substitution effect between on-site
generation and electricity futures is much smaller for the risk-averse consumer. In Case 6-w/
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CHP at B = 100, only a 9 percentage point decrease in the risk premium for electricity
futures leads to 200 kWe less on-site investment. In the same case, the investment cost of
MTs w/ CHP needs to increase by 40% to trigger additional electricity futures purchases.
As the share of electricity purchases is low, increased risk premiums for electricity futures
cannot affect the investment decision. Thus, investment in CHP is relatively insensitive to
large changes in the electricity futures market.
Insight 4-w/ CHP: Gas futures for the boiler are substitutes, while gas futures
for MT are complements for CHP investment.
The effect of gas futures on the use of on-site generation is somewhat ambiguous. On the
one hand, the use of on-site generation increases the value of gas futures for MT; thus,
gas futures and on-site generation are complements. On the other hand, gas futures might
decrease the risk-averse demand for CHP as they can reduce the CVaR when used with the
boiler. While in the cases w/o CHP the boiler is operated independently of the MT, in the
cases w/ CHP, the consumer does not run the boiler and the CHP at full capacity at the
same time as this would generate waste heat. This is why gas futures for boiler and on-site
generation with CHP can be substitutes. In Case 7-w/ CHP at B = 100, a change in the
risk premium for gas futures does not affect the investment decision. However, when the
investment cost increases, the demand for gas futures for MT decreases, while the demand
for gas futures for boiler increases. The same interaction can be observed when we run Case
8-w/ CHP but without gas futures for MT. In the most risk-averse regime, the consumer
decreases its investment to 600 kWe and increases its electricity futures and gas futures for
boiler purchases. Comparing the effects of electricity and gas futures, in Case 8-w/ CHP, a
9 percentage point decrease in the risk premium of electricity futures results in a 200 kWe
decrease in on-site investment. However, if this is accompanied by a one percentage point
decrease in the premium of gas futures, then the consumer maintains its 800 kWe investment.
Thus, gas futures and on-site generation are complements as the substitution effect of gas
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futures for the boiler is dominated by the complementarity effect of gas futures for MT in
most cases. The substitution effect of gas futures eclipses the complementarity effect only
when the economics of CHP deteriorate significantly. For example, in Case 8-w/ CHP at
B = 100, if the cost of CHP increases by 40%, then the consumer invests in less on-site
generation; however, if gas futures for the boiler were not available, then it would still invest
in 800 kWe CHP. Thus, the availability of gas futures results in more investment in CHP
under the current market conditions.
These insights are robust with respect to the values of the uncertain parameters. For
example, with higher electricity price volatility, the value of on-site generation as a physical
hedge increases compared to financial hedges. With lower correlation between electricity and
gas prices, on-site generation works less efficiently as a physical hedge, but the complemen-
tarity effect of gas futures increases.
5 Conclusions
Deregulation has introduced new challenges and opportunities within the energy sector.
Consumers face uncertain electricity and gas prices, which significantly increases their risk
exposure. On the other hand, consumers can now invest in on-site generation or use futures
to hedge against increased price risk. While financial hedges play an increasingly important
role in the energy markets, investment in new technologies provides more social benefits,
such as higher energy efficiency and lower CO2 emissions, as shown in [9]. Still, despite
the ongoing efforts of policymakers to support CHP implementation, the investment rate is
lagging behind the desired targets [29, 35, 36].
Possible explanations for this are volatile gas spark spreads and risk aversion among
smaller potential investors. Indeed, managing the risk from such ventures requires more
sophisticated decision support. Using stochastic programming, we show that even financial
hedges alone enable the CVaR of the consumer to be reduced by 6.7% relative to procuring all
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energy on the spot market. On-site generation functions as an even more effective (physical)
physical hedge against electricity price volatility, which is likely to increase due to the rising
share of intermittent generation. Since conventional decision-making frameworks do not
take into account risk aversion, decision makers without access to stochastic programming
techniques might overlook the significant value of CHP as a physical hedge. As CHP is more
energy efficient than purchasing electricity from the grid and using a gas-fired boiler for heat
production, it is also associated with lower CO2 emissions and can help to achieve the 2020
goals set by the EU, e.g., CHP with financial hedging reduces expected CO2 emissions by
17.3% vis-a`-vis using only the spot market. Likewise, the consumer’s risk can be further
decreased by using CHP along with electricity and gas futures, e.g., CHP together with
financial hedging reduces the consumer’s CVaR by 18.6% relative to relying on the spot
market only for meeting its energy needs.
While we demonstrate that electricity futures and on-site generation are substitutes,
the availability of electricity futures impedes investments mostly in technologies without
CHP. Microturbines with heat recovery are more efficient hedges as they can swap the high
volatility of the electricity price for the low volatility of the spot gas price. Consequently,
the consumer is not exposed to peaks in electricity prices when the use of financial futures
would be a more costly alternative. Intriguingly, we show that gas futures and on-site
generation can complement each other as a consumer is more likely to install additional
generation capacity when gas futures are available. In fact, the availability of gas futures
can neutralise the substitution effect of electricity futures, thereby contributing to higher
investment. Nevertheless, the interaction between financial and physical hedges depends on
both the level of risk aversion of the consumer and on the underlying electricity and gas
price processes.
As with any analysis focusing on long-term decisions, our work is limited by the as-
sumptions that enable us to keep the investment problem computationally tractable. Since
quarterly average spot prices have lower volatility than hourly spot prices, using them under-
28
estimates the CVaR-reducing impact of CHP. Furthermore, consumers can purchase weekly
and monthly electricity futures for base load, peak load, and off-peak load periods as well
as monthly gas futures, which increase the CVaR-reducing potential of financial hedging.
In addition to examining long-term investment decisions, investors also need to take into
account short-term operational decisions when considering risk management using financial
and physical hedges. Indeed, in spite of the capability of CHP to serve as an effective hedge
against market risk and to support policy objectives, its adoption is hampered by barriers
such as static building energy management systems (BEMS) currently installed by most
consumers. Since these static BEMS are built on proprietary software, they require greater
sophistication to be adjusted in order to incorporate more dynamic operational strategies.
Rocha et al. [38] discuss such barriers in the context of short-term building operations. For
this reason, we plan to focus our future research efforts on the optimal operation of an on-site
generation system in the short and medium terms.
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Appendix A Notation
Sets
b(n) ∈ N \ NT : ancestor node of node n ∈ N \ N1
I: set of technologies
M := {1, . . . ,M}: set of subperiods
N : set of nodes in the scenario tree
Nt ∈ N : set of nodes belonging to main period t ∈ T
S: set of subscenario paths at a given node in the scenario tree
T := {1, . . . , T}: set of main time periods
t(n) ∈ T : main time period of node n ∈ N
Fixed Parameters
A: confidence level for the CVaR
B: weight assigned to CVaR
C: CO2 emissions rate of the consumer from burning gas on-site (ton of CO2/MWh)
De: electricity load in each subperiod (MWe)
Dh: heat load in each subperiod (MW)
Eb: boiler conversion efficiency, i.e., units of useful heat produced from one MWh of natural
gas (MWh/MWh)
Eei : electrical conversion efficiency, i.e., units of electricity produced from one MWh of
natural gas, of technology i ∈ I (MWhe/MWh)
Ehi : heat capture rate from CHP, i.e., units of useful heat produced from one MWhe of
electricity, of technology i ∈ I (MWh/MWhe)
G: length of each main period in years (a)
H: length of each subperiod in years (a)
J = 8760: number of hours in a year (h/a)
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Kei : capacity of electricity generation unit of technology i ∈ I (MWe)
Kb: capacity of boiler unit (MW)
Lc: tax on CO2 emissions (e/ton of CO2)
Ni: amortised cost over T ×M subperiods of installing technology i ∈ I, paid per subperiod
(e)
Qn: probability of node n ∈ N
Qss: conditional probability of subscenario path s ∈ S within a particular node
R: risk-free interest rate per annum
V e: variable operating and maintenance (O&M) cost of electricity generation (e/MWh)
Random Parameters
F en: multi-subperiod-ahead forward price of electricity at node n ∈ N purchased at the
beginning of the node’s main period and delivered in each subperiod and subscenario path
of the node (e/MWhe)
F gn : multi-subperiod-ahead forward price of natural gas at node n ∈ N purchased at the
beginning of the node’s main period and delivered in each subperiod and subscenario path
of the node (e/MWh)
P en,s,m: spot price of electricity at node n ∈ N in subscenario path s ∈ S and subperiod
m ∈M (e/MWhe)
P gn,s,m: spot price of gas at node n ∈ N in subscenario path s ∈ S and subperiod m ∈ M
(e/MWh)
Decision Variables
γn: present value of the cumulative cost of satisfying the electricity and heat loads up until
main period t(n) at node n ∈ N (e)
ηn: auxiliary variable to calculate the CVaR at node n ∈ N (e)
ξ: value-at-risk at confidence level A (e)
̟n: the expected present value at beginning of main period t(n) of the spot operational and
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amortised capital cost of all subperiods at node n ∈ N (e)
Φn: total cost of purchasing futures for the consumer at node n ∈ N at the beginning of the
node’s main period (e)
Ψ: total amortised capital cost for the selected technologies (e)
Ωn,s,m: total spot operational cost of the consumer at node n ∈ N in subscenario path s ∈ S
during subperiod m ∈M (e)
hi,n,s,m: recovered heat from technology i ∈ I used to meet heat load at node n ∈ N in
subscenario path s ∈ S during subperiod m ∈M (MWh)
wi: binary variable, now-or-never decision to install technology i ∈ I at t = 1
xn,s,m: electricity purchased from the spot market at node n ∈ N in subscenario path s ∈ S
during subperiod m ∈M (MWhe)
xfn: electricity futures purchased in node n ∈ N at the beginning of the node’s main period,
for delivery in all subscenario paths and in each subperiod of the node (MWhe)
yi,n,s,m: natural gas purchased from the spot market for cogeneration using technology i ∈ I
at node n ∈ N and in subscenario path s ∈ S during subperiod m ∈M (MWh)
yfi,n: natural gas futures purchased for cogeneration using technology i ∈ I in node n ∈ N
at the beginning of the node’s main period, for delivery in all subscenario paths and in each
subperiod of the node (MWh)
zn,s,m: natural gas purchased from the spot market for boiler heat production at node n ∈ N
in subscenario path s ∈ S during subperiod m ∈M (MWh)
zfn: natural gas futures purchased for boiler heat production in node n ∈ N at the beginning
of the node’s main period, for delivery in all subscenario paths and in each subperiod of the
node (MWh)
Appendix B Scenario Generation
The electricity and gas price scenarios are generated in two steps. First, we use the scenario
tree method to generate the average electricity (P¯ en) and gas (P¯
g
n) prices within each node
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n ∈ N . At end of main period t(n), the average electricity (gas) price can increase, U en = +1
(Ugn = +1), or decrease U
e
n = −1 (Ugn = −1). Thus, from each node there are four branches,
each corresponding to a different state of the average electricity and gas prices (Fig. 6).
(a) Main scenarios (b) Subscenarios
Figure 6: Scenario generation
We assume that the long-term average electricity and gas prices follow correlated geomet-
ric Brownian motions (GBMs) with zero drift, volatilities σeo and σ
g
o, respectively, and price
correlation ρo. The scenario tree is generated through an extension of the log-transformed
binomial lattice [37].
ln P¯ en = ln P¯
e
b(n) + σ
e
o
√
GU en, ∀n ∈ N (14)
ln P¯ gn = ln P¯
g
b(n) + σ
g
o
√
GUgn, ∀n ∈ N , (15)
where:
(U en, U
g
n) =


(+1,+1) with probability (1+ρo)
4
(+1,−1) with probability (1−ρo)
4
(−1,+1) with probability (1−ρo)
4
(−1,−1) with probability (1+ρo)
4
(16)
Once we obtain for each node the average electricity (P¯ en) and gas (P¯
g
n) prices, we generate
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scenario paths based on a scenario fan, which are referred to as subscenarios and indexed
by s ∈ S. This way, we obtain the electricity (P en,s,m) and gas (P gn,s,m) spot prices for each
subscenario s ∈ S and subperiod m ∈M based on the average price within the node n ∈ N .
We assume that the short-term prices follow correlated Wiener processes with zero drift and
are generated through the well-known stochastic differential equations of the two-dimensional
correlated Wiener process [32], ∀n ∈ N , s ∈ S,m′ ∈M:
P en,s,m′ = P¯
e
n +
m′∑
m=1
σeqǫ
e
n,s,m (17)
P
g
n,s,m′ = P¯
g
n +
m′∑
m=1
(
σgqρqǫ
e
n,s,m + σ
g
q
√
1− ρ2qǫgn,s,m
)
(18)
where σeq (σ
g
q) denotes the short-term electricity (gas) price volatility, ρq represents the short-
term price correlation, ǫen,s,m ∼ N(0, 1), and ǫgn,s,m ∼ N(0, 1). While correlated GBMs do not
take into account certain characteristics of commodity price dynamics (i.e., mean reversion
or price jumps for the electricity price), these effects on modelling long-term average prices
are negligible, and therefore GBMs are widely used in investment analysis [20]. Our aim
is to generate scenarios that reflect uncertainties but that maintain characteristics that are
likely to hold in the immediate future, such as the correlation between gas and electricity
prices. Finally, the prices of electricity (F en) and gas (F
g
n) futures contracts are calculated
as the expected spot price at node n ∈ N multiplied by the risk premia (Re for electricity
futures and Rg for gas futures) representing the persistent differences between the futures
prices and their expected spot prices:
F en =
(∑
s∈S
Qss
1
M
M∑
m=1
P en,s,m
)
(1 +Re) (19)
F gn =
(∑
s∈S
Qss
1
M
M∑
m=1
P gn,s,m
)
(1 +Rg) (20)
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